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ABSTRACT 
Al-Shabaab poses a persistent threat in the Horn of Africa, able to mount spectacular 
transnational attacks such as the siege on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013 
and twin suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010. Particularly worrying for 
Western governments is the group’s merger with al-Qaeda, combined with its ability to 
recruit fighters from Europe and North America. Al-Shabaab’s extensive use of 
propaganda to gain recruits and external support has been well documented. Most studies 
of al-Shabaab’s propaganda activities are centered on techniques, mediums and themes, 
with little focus on effectiveness. This study seeks to determine the effectiveness of al-
Shabaab’s propaganda by quantitatively evaluating the relationship between propaganda 
and behaviors linked to the strategic effects sought by al-Shabaab. Statistical analysis is 
used to determine the significant relationships between al-Shabaab propaganda, target 
audience behaviors, and desired effects. Results demonstrate that al-Shabaab’s 
propaganda is statistically ineffective at achieving the desired effect. This research 
recommends a strategy to counter al-Shabaab propaganda focused on disruption of al-
Shabaab’s message dissemination, providing a credible alternative to the group’s 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
I say to you: that we are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is in 
the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for 
the hearts and minds of our Umma.1  
—Ayman al Zawahiri, 
leader of al-Qaeda 
 
A typically peaceful Saturday afternoon in an upscale neighborhood in Nairobi 
was shattered with grenades and gunfire on September 21–24, 2013, as the Somali 
terrorist group al-Shabaab launched a four day siege on the Westgate Mall. The aftermath 
of the attack resulted in extensive property damage, 72 people dead, and the 
embarrassment of the Kenyan government for its uncoordinated response to the assault.2  
As the world watched the siege unfold, al-Shabaab capitalized on its moment in the 
spotlight to propagate its narrative. Using microblogging sites such as Twitter and 
releasing audio statements from the group’s reclusive leader Ahmed Godane, al-Shabaab 
gained a global audience for its message of defending Muslims, avenging the plight of 
Somalis injured in Kenya’s military operations, and demanding a Kenyan withdrawal 
from Somalia.3   
For al-Shabaab, the attention gained from the media circus surrounding the 
Westgate Mall attack provided a much needed publicity boost following two years of 
internal divisions and military setbacks. With the loss of 35 to 50 million dollars of 
annual revenue generated by the  Bakara Market in Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo 
that were reclaimed by African Union forces in 2011 and 2012, al-Shabaab seemed to be 
                                                 
1 Letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (July 9, 2005): quoted in Seth G. Jones, 
The Terrorist Threat From Al-Shabaab (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 6. 
2 Nicholas Soi and Robyn Dixon, “Kenyan Siege Ends; Toll at 72,” Los Angeles Times (September 25, 
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/25/world/la-fg-kenya-mall-20130925.  
3 Christopher Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al Shabab’s Media Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 6, no. 
10 (October 2013). 
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on the verge of defeat.4  Compounding the territorial losses, the long-defunct Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia adopted a constitution, elected a new president, 
and supplanted al-Shabaab governance in southern Somalia in 2012. The new Somali 
government gained much needed international credibility through formal recognition by 
the United States in January 2013, which is the first time in over 20 years that a Somali 
government was recognized as legitimate by the United States.5  Infighting and 
defections among senior al-Shabaab leaders and foreign fighters further compounded the 
group’s troubles.6 
Despite these setbacks, al-Shabaab remains a persistent threat in the Horn of 
Africa, able to mount spectacular transnational attacks such as the siege on the Westgate 
Mall and twin suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda in 2010. Particularly worrying for 
Western governments is the group’s merger with al-Qaeda, combined with its ability to 
recruit fighters from Europe and North America.7  Al-Shabaab’s extensive use of 
propaganda to gain recruits and external support has been well documented, particularly 
with the group’s ability to attract fighters from Western countries. Most of the focus on 
al-Shabaab’s propaganda activities is centered on techniques and mediums such as social 
media, as well as the particular themes and messages being propagated.8  The linkage 
between al-Shabaab’s propaganda and organizational goals needs a closer evaluation to 
determine how effective propaganda is in advancing al-Shabaab’s strategic objectives in 
                                                 
4 Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, “Kenya: Civil War Breaks Out Within Al-Shabaab,” Global Information 
Network (October 22, 2013), ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1443845857?accountid=12702. 
5 Jane Morse, “Somalia’s Fledgling Democracy Wins U.S. Recognition,” Department of State 
International Information Program, 17 January 2013, http://iiipdigital.usembassy.gov. 
6 Roble, “Civil War Breaks Out Within Al-Shabaab.” 
7 Matthew J. Thomas, “Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-
Shabaab,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 24:3, 417, Taylor & Francis, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2013.802611.  
8 Alexander Melegrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, James Sheehan, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s 
Western Media Strategy,” The international Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 
9, 2012, www.icsr.info. 
 3 
Somalia. This thesis will seek to determine the effectiveness of al-Shabaab’s propaganda 
at influencing the behavior of target audiences in East Africa.9 
                                                 
9 The definition of propaganda used for this thesis is found in Joint Publication 1–02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (November 2010): “Any form of adversary 
communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence opinions, emotions, 
attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.” (emphasis 
added) 
 4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Somalia is a country that has a tragic history marked by extreme drought, famine, 
violence, and lack of effective governance since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. 
The combination of these factors led to Somalia consistently topping the Fund for Peace 
Failed State Index as the epitome of a failed state.
10
  Attacks such as the 1998 bombings 
of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2002 hotel bombing and attempted shoot 
down of an Israeli airliner in Mombasa, the 2010 coordinated suicide bombings in 
Uganda, persistent piracy in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden, and the 2013 siege on 
the Westgate Mall in Nairobi are examples of the regional instability emanating from 
Somalia that challenge U.S. interests.
11
  As with many violent organizations, al-Shabaab 
has made extensive use of the information environment as part of its strategy to further its 
objectives of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia. Studies conducted by organizations 
such as the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
(ISCR) and West Point’s Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) primarily focus on al-
Shabaab’s information strategy as it relates to the conflict in Somalia, al-Shabaab’s 
relationship with al-Qaeda, and the group’s ability to attract foreign recruits. Little 
consideration has been given to the effectiveness of the group’s information strategy, 
with no quantitative analysis comparing al-Shabaab propaganda with attainment of the 
group’s strategic objectives over time. In simpler terms – the question of whether or not 
the propaganda output is effective has not been sufficiently asked or answered in 
previous studies. 
Determining the effectiveness of terrorism to achieve policy goals is at best a 
tenuous undertaking with no easily drawn conclusions, particularly when trying to 
determine to what extent propaganda advances the goals of a terrorist group. The 
                                                 
10 Felipe Umaña, “The Recovery of Somalia: Check Back With Us Again Next Year,” Fund for Peace 
Failed State Index, June 24 2013, www.library.fundforpeace.org/fsi13-somalia. 
11 LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and Other Sources of Instability in Africa, 112
th
 Cong. 11, 
(2012) (Testimony of Don Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African 
Affairs). 
 6 
available literature dealing with terrorism effectiveness tends to primarily focus on the 
actions of a terror group, the counterterrorism response from the authorities, or the 
interaction of the two or more actors in a struggle for control over a population or 
territory. Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson study the effectiveness of terrorism as a 
struggle between the government and a terror group for popular support by reviewing the 
severity of a government’s response to terrorism in proportion to the terrorist’s actions 
and the population’s attitudes about government motivation.12  By developing a game 
theory model, Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson examine the strategic interactions 
between three actors – terrorist, government, and the population, with the terrorist and the 
government competing for support of the population. Population support is measured as 
mobilization towards or away from the extremist cause.13  The model developed indicates 
that a terrorist group can increase its support base through provoking government 
counterterrorism actions that impose a high cost such as physical and economic damage 
to the population, regardless of the government’s intent. If a government tries to conduct 
discriminate counterterrorism operations, yet is perceived by the population to be 
operating indiscriminately resulting in high damage, support to the terror group 
increases.14  This would indicate that while actions and intrinsic motivations for the 
government are important towards increasing security and degrading support for a 
terrorist group, the public perceptions of counterterrorism operations are a determining 
factor in gaining support of a population.15 
Similar to Bueno de Mesquita’s assertion that the effectiveness of 
counterterrorism is based on the target population’s perception of the nature of the 
government, Max Abrahms argues that terrorism is not effective due to terrorists 
attacking civilian targets. This tactic leads to a targeted population making inferences 
                                                 
12 Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, 
Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science, 51 no. 2, (April, 2007), 373 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4620071.  
13 Mesquita, “The Propaganda of the Deed,” 373. 
14 Ibid., 374. 
15 Ibid., 377. 
 7 
regarding terrorist intentions following an attack.16  Abrahms claims that terrorist groups 
which predominately attack civilian targets versus military targets are far less likely to 
achieve the group’s stated goals. Success was measured against whether a terrorist 
organization achieved its publically stated strategic goals, using target selection and the 
type of goal (maximalist versus limited) as the independent variables of the study. When 
viewing target selection, Abrahms found that, out of the forty-two strategic objectives 
examined over twenty-eight groups (some groups had multiple policy objectives), there 
were only three cases of a terrorist group successfully achieving a strategic objective – 
yielding a seven percent success rate. The dismal seven-percent success rate was 
determined even with Abrahms using generous metrics for success, admittedly giving 
credit for success even if a terrorist group only partially accomplished its goals, or if 
other factors such as a peace process contributed to the causality of the strategic objective 
being reached.17 
The type of strategic objectives terrorist groups strive for is also an important 
factor in determining the success of a terrorist group. Abrahms classifies objectives as 
maximalist or limited, with limited objectives being focused on demands over territory or 
resources; whereas a maximalist demand involves changing a society’s beliefs, values, or 
ideologies.18  Examples of limited objectives include disputes over territory or trying to 
expel a foreign occupying force, such as Hezbollah expelling the peacekeeping forces 
from Beirut in the early 1980s. Maximalist objectives include trying to “transform the 
political system (usually to either Marxist or Islamist), or annihilate a society because of 
its values.”19  Not surprisingly, Abrahms finds that terrorists are more likely to achieve 
success with limited objectives than with maximalist objectives that pose an existential 
threat to the government or society.   
                                                 
16 Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security, 31, no. 2 (Autumn 2006) 
pg. 56, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137516.  
17 Ibid., 51. 
18 Ibid., 53. 
19 Ibid. 
 8 
Abrahms is careful to note that objective type is not a great predictor of success 
for a terrorist group, claiming that target type is a better predictor when combined with 
objective type. Terrorism is a tactic used by groups to coerce target audiences to 
acquiesce to the group’s demands. The main assertion by Abrahms is that when terrorist 
groups attack civilian targets, the “…groups fail to coerce because they miscommunicate 
their policy objectives.”20  Even with limited objectives, the targeted society infers that 
the terrorist group has maximalist objectives, which in turn decreases the probability of 
the society acquiescing to limited demands.21  To explain this, Abrahms refers to 
correspondent inference theory, which is the cognitive process by which an observer 
infers the motives of an actor.”22  With terrorism, the victimized society infers a 
maximalist objective on the part of the terrorist group through the carnage, fear, and 
damage inflicted by an attack on civilians. In essence, the “objectives of the actor are 
presumed to be encoded in the outcome of the behavior” through the “attribute-effect 
linkage.”23  Through case studies and a review of terror group activities and outcomes, 
Abrahms makes a strong case that the effectiveness of terrorism is limited due to the 
message of a terror group being lost in its actions. 
Countering Abrahms are Kydd and Walter, who make the claim that terrorism is 
an effective tactic to force governments and societies to make concessions favorable to 
terror groups. Kydd and Walter make their claim based on terrorist groups not being 
strong enough to directly confront the state, and thus resorting to “costly signaling” to 
demonstrate the group’s commitment and ability to inflict costs on the targeted society.24  
In essence, costly-signaling is a means for an organization, be it terrorist or government, 
to indicate to its adversary that the organization is serious about achieving its goals 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 56. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 58. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Andrew H. Kydd, Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security, 31 no. 1 
(Summer 2006),50. 
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through “taking actions so costly that bluffers and liars are unwilling to take them.”25  
Through costly signaling, a terror organization can draw attention to its cause, 
demonstrate capability, and show resolve towards accomplishing its goal, even at a great 
price to both the group and the targeted population.   
Costly signaling derives from a group’s uncertainty regarding its opponent that 
leads to conflict, such as a security dilemma.26  Uncertainty manifests itself through 
conflicts between belligerents’ power, resolve, and trustworthiness. This is combined 
with the need of a terrorist group to influence an adversarial government and the target 
population while influencing the group’s own followers to conform to ideology and 
provide vital resources.27  Combining uncertainty with target audiences yields five 
influence strategies that a terrorist group could apply through costly signaling to achieve 
its objectives. The five strategies involve attrition, spoiling, intimidation, outbidding, and 
provocation.28  Attrition and spoiling strategies focus on influencing the adversary 
through making the counterterrorism policy too costly to maintain, or by sabotaging a 
peace process to further long term goals. Terrorists use intimidation, outbidding and 
provocation to influence their friendly population to increase support through threatened 
violence, showing greater zeal for the cause than other rival groups, or by provoking an 
overreaction by the government to disenfranchise a larger segment of the population akin 
to Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson’s model. 
Kydd and Walter argue that the aforementioned information strategies are 
instrumental in terrorist groups achieving their ultimate goals. The goals of terrorism 
include: regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo 
maintenance.29  Like both Bueno de Mesquita and Abrahms, Kydd and Walter conclude 
that information and perceptions are the key determinants of terrorists’ success or failure. 
                                                 
25 Kydd, “The Strategies of Terrorism,”58. 
26 Ibid., 57 
27 Ibid., 58. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 52. 
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Unlike Abrahms, however, Kydd and Walter make their claim that terrorism works 
“because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’ 
cause.”30  However, provoking a response is not the same as successfully accomplishing 
one of the five strategic goals previously listed by Kydd and Walter. A group can 
successfully use the attrition strategy to cause a change in a country’s counterterrorism 
strategy to one that is less costly, though the group may not be any closer to achieving its 
desired end state of regime change or social control. 
When studying al-Shabaab, available literature on the group tends to focus 
specifically on the motives of the group, its relationship with al-Qaeda, or on al-
Shabaab’s use of various media platforms such as Internet forums and social media to 
advance its narrative. There is general agreement that al-Shabaab has its origins in the 
Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which formed as a pseudo-government providing some 
semblance of law and order through strict enforcement of sharia law in vast ungoverned 
areas of Somalia.31  When the ICU threatened the UN-sponsored Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) in Baidoa in 2006 Ethiopia intervened, defeated the ICU, and 
reestablished the TFG in Mogadishu.32  As moderate factions of the ICU sought 
negotiations to end the conflict with Ethiopia, militant leaders with connections to al-
Qaeda rejected any concessions to non-Muslim countries and inflamed Somali nationalist 
sentiment to attract recruits for an insurgency against Somalia’s long-time nemesis 
Ethiopia.33 
The guerrilla war with Ethiopia solidified al-Shabaab’s global jihadist ideology, 
which diverged from the ICU’s more nationalist goals. The conflict with Ethiopia was 
framed as part of a global struggle in line with al-Qaeda’s transnational jihad, with the 
Ethiopians and TFG acting as puppets of the Western “far enemy” intent on attacking 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 50. 
31 LRA, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, AQIM and other Sources of Instability in Africa, 112
th
 Cong.  11, 





Islam.34  Melegrou-Hitchens provides context by stating “Somali-Ethiopian relations are 
as tense and incorrigible as those one might expect of India and Pakistan,” with the added 
hostility towards the U.S. and Ethiopia compounding nationalist sentiments.35  
Complicating matters were the U.S., African Union (AU), and UN backing of the TFG, 
lending credence to a Christian conspiracy against Islamic Somalia that al-Shabaab 
propagated.36  Vidino assessed Somalis perceived the U.S. backing of Ethiopia “…as a 
desire to avenge the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident, or as part of a larger plan to 
attack Muslim countries.”37 
This narrative is attributed to al-Shabaab having an “unprecedented number of 
Western recruits, many of whom are U.S. and European passport holders.”38  Melegrou-
Hitchens pays particular attention to a-Shabaab propaganda targeting the West, focusing 
on the narrative and delivery of the message. The group has made efforts to use Western 
personalities with bona fide global jihadist credentials to attract foreign recruits. Non-
Somali Westerners in al-Shabaab such as Alabama native Omar Hamammi provided 
commentary regarding the duty of Muslims to fight the West, and encouraged travel to 
areas of conflict to join the jihad. Hamammi characterizes the conflict with the West as a 
zero-sum game, in which “the West is locked in an existential conflict with Islam and 
cannot coexist with it,” essentially encouraging Muslims to “pick a side.”39 
Migrating to establish an Islamic state is a concept from the earliest days of Islam 
known as hijrah. Melegrou-Hitchens links the concept of hijrah with prominent al-Qaeda 
personalities such as Bin Laden and Anwar Awlaki, who both preached travel to Muslim 
lands for jihad as a principal duty of believers, and set the example themselves by 
                                                 
34 Lorenzo Vidino, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of 
Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict,” African Security, 
November 2010, 3:4, Taylor & Francis, doi: 10.1080/19392206.2010.533071. 
35 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 11. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Vidino, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab,” 220. 
38 Thomas, “Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab,” 417. 
39 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 14. 
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forsaking comfortable lives for hardships associated with jihad.40  Hamammi echoes 
Awlaki and Bin Laden, urging the American Muslims to participate in hijrah, postulating 
that remaining in the U.S. is a mortal sin due to America’s secular society and open 
hostility towards Islam.41   
Al-Shabaab’s focus on hijrah and transnational jihad gives the outward 
appearance of being in lock step with al-Qaeda. Vidino highlights the relationship 
between the groups as a matter of shared ideology, solidifying the religiosity of al-
Shabaab’s ideology following the split from the ICU and departure of Ethiopian troops.42  
Vidino is careful to not confuse endorsement and cooperation for an outright merger of 
the two groups. Instead, the focus is on endorsements Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda 
figures made towards al-Shabaab, including videos entitled “Fight On, Champions of 
Somalia,” and “No Peace Without Islam” that specifically endorse al-Shabaab and list 
Somalia as a front in the global jihad.43  Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda eventually merged on 
9 February, 2012, a relationship the West will have to contend with to determine its 
significance. Vidino recognized the potential effects of placing a local conflict into an 
international context – local groups will benefit from additional resources, while al-
Qaeda’s narrative of being a global movement is further validated. 
Thomas provides an example of cooperation between franchises by reviewing the 
relationship between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), where 
Somalis account for approximately 50 percent of AQAP’s foreign fighter force.44  
Despite the potential for increased cooperation following the merger, theories exist that 
the merger was among two groups on the verge of defeat.45  Both groups sought to 
capitalize on increased exposure in an attempt to remain relevant and keep the global 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Vidino, “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the 
Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” 
43 Ibid 
44 Thomas, “Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab,” 421. 
45 Ibid. 
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jihad ideology alive.46  In the months leading up to the merger, al-Shabaab had suffered 
its most serious setbacks to date, withdrawing from Mogadishu while simultaneously 
facing Kenyan forces advancing from the South and Ethiopian forces advancing from the 
east. Al Qaeda was still recovering from the deaths of Bin Laden and Abu Yahya al-Libi 
while facing additional pressure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seemingly on the verge of 
defeat.47 
With the preponderance of literature focused on the ideology of al-Shabaab and 
its connection to al-Qaeda in relation to attracting foreign fighters and conducting 
transnational jihad, there is little analysis conducted regarding the effectiveness of al-
Shabaab’s messaging campaign in relation to its objectives. Qualitative analysis of al-
Shabaab messaging focuses on the group’s violence, recruitment of fighters from 
Western nations (mostly from the large Somali diaspora), and al-Shabaab’s activity on 
the Internet with high-quality video productions and prolific Twitter activity.48  Applying 
previously mentioned frameworks to judge the effectiveness of propaganda would also be 
incomplete. Abrahms’ theory would focus on al-Shabaab progress towards its strategic 
goals in light of target selection for attacks. Kydd and Walter would analyze al-Shabaab 
actions as a form of costly signaling through attrition, intimidation, and provocation to 
affect regime change and social control – again focusing on kinetic actions as the primary 
means of signaling resolve and intentions to the target.49  Bueno de Mesquita and 
Dickson’s game-theory approach wouldn’t focus on al-Shabaab’ targeting per se, but 
instead model the relationship of the action-reaction cycle between al-Shabaab and 
government authorities to the level of radicalization and mobilization of the population in 
support of al-Shabaab. What is further missing from Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson is a 
concrete description of observable behaviors within the target audience that would 
indicate an increase or decrease in radicalized behavior and mobilization from 
populations in support of terrorist groups. 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy” pg. 30. 
49 Kydd, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” 51–52. 
 14 
A serious quantitative effort to demonstrate the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of 
al-Shabaab propaganda is lacking. The closest anyone has come in this regard is 
Melegrou-Hitchens in his study of al-Shabaab video and Twitter usage targeting 
Westerners. Even this study primarily focuses on the content and frequency of various 
themes to establish al-Shabaab’s narrative as “a united and effective fighting force that is 
promoting God’s will,” with the Somali conflict portrayed as an assault on Islam by the 
TFG and Western powers.50  The analysis only superficially evaluates behaviors through 
examining known foreign fighters and suicide bombings, but not studying trends in 
behavior exhibited in targeted populations at large. By quantitatively analyzing al-
Shabaab’s propaganda output with the group’s strategic objectives and observable 
behavioral changes in target populations, the gap between Bueno de Mesquita and 
Dickson, Kydd and Walter, and Abrahms’ theories of information’s role in achieving 
strategic objectives can be partially filled. 
 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 41. 
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III. APPROACH 
This study used a quantitative approached to determine the effectiveness of al-
Shabaab’s propaganda towards achieving strategic objectives. For the purposes of this 
analysis, the Joint Staff definition of propaganda is used, with particular emphasis placed 
on the use of propaganda as a means to influence the behavior of the target audience.
51
  
Through influencing target audiences’ beliefs and perceptions, effective propaganda 
should result in an observable behavior that can then be quantified if the propaganda were 
to achieve its intended purpose.   
Al-Shabaab radio broadcasts from its Radio Andalus program along with the 
group’s Twitter activity from December 2011 through December 2013 is evaluated for 
effectiveness. These dates were chosen to correspond with the creation of al-Shabaab’s 
Twitter account through the 90-day aftermath of the Westgate Mall attack. This 
timeframe also coincides with a dynamic operational period for al-Shabaab, during which 
the group was prolific in propaganda output and al-Shabaab’s while its adversaries were 
active in countering al-Shabaab militarily and politically. The focus on social media and 
radio transcripts allows for a higher number of observations to conduct statistical analysis 
with easily quantifiable coding as the radio transcripts and tweets are treated as discreet 
events. Each al-Shabaab product will be coded by date, source, theme, and desired effect. 
This study will expand on Melegrou-Hitchens’ work on al-Shabaab propaganda, which 
only quantitatively covered twitter activity through September 20, 2012.52    
                                                 
51 Propaganda is defined in Joint Publication 1–02 (November 2010) as “Any form of adversary 
communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, 
attitudes, or behavior of any group to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”  The cognitive 
dimension of the information environment is identified in Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations, 
as the most important dimension to influence as that is where target audiences and decision makers process 
information and make decisions that are beneficial or detrimental to the desired effects. 
52 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 32. 
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A. CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Each propaganda product will be coded into one of seven themes developed by 
James Forest’s study of al-Qaeda propaganda and adopted by Melegrou-Hitchens to 
evaluate al-Shabaab’s media strategy.53 The themes used to describe al-Shabaab 
propaganda are: religious authority, strategic authority, group integrity and cohesion, 
competing voices, narrative, operational capacity, and relevance.54    These themes each 
correspond with one of two main effects sought by al-Shabaab—mobilize for jihad, and 
undermining support for Western and Somali governments and the UN-sponsored 
African Union Mission in Somalia  (AMISOM )—referenced as “degrade support” 
throughout the remainder of this study.55   
Observable behaviors related to al-Shabaab’s propaganda are determined for each 
desired effect using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED) and the Open Source Center.  This study will focus on al-Shabaab inspired 
attacks, anti-government protests, suicide bombings, arrests of suspected al-Shabaab 
members outside of Somalia, and media critical of AMISOM as observable behaviors 
indicating propaganda effectiveness. Desired effects and observed behavior are evaluated 
over time to determine if behaviors correspond to al-Shabaab’s dissemination of 
propaganda. Target audience behavior will be the dependent variable observed against 
the independent variables of al-Shabaab propaganda themes with the corresponding 
desired effects. Since count data is used to code the data, a quasi-Poisson regression will 
be used to conduct statistical analysis and determine if there is a statistically significant 
relationship between propaganda and behavior, with significance being judged at the 95 
percent confidence level (p<0.05). 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 31. 
54 Ibid. 
55 “Mobilize for jihad” refers to active participation in the conflict through either traveling to Somalia 
to fight (hijrah) or conducting attacks against Western, AMISOM, or Somali government target outside of 
Somalia.  “Degrade Support” refers to more passive participation in the conflict through diminishing active 
support to the Somali government, AMISOM, and Western efforts, or tacit support of al-Shabaab effort. 
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B. PROPAGANDA THEMES 
1. Competing Voices 
Competing voices is focused towards discrediting Western and regional media 
outlets and describing any media outlet that is critical of al-Shabaab as corrupt or lying. 
Propaganda fitting this theme could take the form of general criticism of Western media 
corruption, particularly in accusing media outlets of participating in a “war on Islam.”  
Al-Shabaab also responds to specific events, media reports, and personalities to discredit 
or mock their reporting on al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab also attempts to perpetrate itself as a 
credible news source, particularly during spectacular events such as the Westgate attack, 
with al-Shabaab’s Twitter account posting “Journalist should contact HSM Press Office 
for further verification. All journalists in HSM (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen) 
Mailing list have been notified #Westgate.”56 
2. Narrative 
The Narrative theme focuses on discrediting Western influence, in addition to 
discrediting AMISOM and the Somali government. Narrative is differentiated from 
competing voices by not focusing specifically on adversary media outlets or personalities, 
but on the governments, people, an organizations of Western and regional adversaries. A 
key component of the narrative theme involves portraying the actions of Western nations, 
the Somali government, and AMISOM as being part of a larger war on Islam, with the 
governments in the Horn of Africa beholden to Western interest. Highlighting adversary 
failures is a technique employed by al-Shabaab as part of its narrative to discredit 
adversaries. Highlighting failures involves describing areas under control of AMISOM or 
the Somali government as being unstable and insecure, even if the insecurity is 
perpetrated by al-Shabaab itself. Battlefield failures of Somali, AMISOM, or Western 
forces, as well as failures in governance are used to perpetuate the narrative theme of al-
Shabaab. Governments are not alone in drawing criticism from al-Shabaab for 
                                                 
56 Open Source Center, “Somalia: Twitter Suspends Fifth Al-Shabaab Account for Posting Details of 
Nairobi Mall Siege,” September 23 2013. 
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involvement in Somalia, with non-Islamic relief organizations also being criticized for 
either spreading infidel ideology or distributing tainted goods as part of the relief effort. 
3. Group Identity and Cohesion 
Group integrity and cohesion is focused on promoting al-Shabaab as a unified 
organization both internally and externally with Somali culture, Muslims, and fellow 
jihadist movements. Promoting internal integrity involves demonstrating al-Shabaab 
cohesiveness and refuting allegations of schisms within the group. The primary focus of 
this theme revolves around showing unity within Somali society, by demonstrating 
support garnered from traditional clan leadership, thus achieving a level of legitimacy 
within Somalia and its vast diaspora. Also important for potential foreign supporters is al-
Shabaab’s ability to demonstrate a level of solidarity with other Muslims, particularly 
with other more recognizable jihadi movements. Expressions of support with Egyptian 
demonstrators in Tahrir Square are an example of demonstrating solidarity with other 
Muslims with the tweet “HSM welcomes the demonstration held by the #Egyptian 
Muslims calling for Islamic Sharia to be implemented in that Muslim land.”57 
4. Operational Capacity 
Operational capacity seeks to instill “confidence and competence” in al-Shabaab 
by demonstrating the group is comprised of serious warriors and that al-Shabaab is 
capable of inflicting damage to its enemies.58  Messages in this theme describe attacks by 
al-Shabaab, boast about inflicting casualties against AMISOM, and describe effects of 
the damage on the group’s enemies. These messages often take the tone of press releases 
or news reporting from field correspondents. Another key feature of this theme is the 
articulations of threats towards adversaries. Through continually demonstrating capacity 
with through continual reporting of both asymmetric and symmetric attacks in a variety 
                                                 
57 Open Source Center, “Highlights of al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 9–14 November 2012,” 15 
November 2012. 
58 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 36. 
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of circumstances, threats made by al-Shabaab carry more credibility despite the inherent 
truthfulness of the threat.59 
5. Strategic Authority 
The strategic authority theme is used by al-Shabaab to provide context to its 
actions, demonstrate itself as a vanguard for establishing an Islamic state in Somalia, and 
describe the strategic vision of the group. Messages that justify al-Shabaab’s actions fall 
into this category, such as the group justifying posting pictures of a dead French 
commando to Twitter following the failed rescue attempt of Denis Alex in January 
2013.60  Describing the vision of the group also fits into this category, such as explaining 
the end state of establishing sharia law in Somalia or stating conditions the Kenyan 
government must meet for the release of prisoners held by the group.   
In portraying itself as a competent vanguard of jihad within Somalia, al-Shabaab 
is claiming that the group is the most capable of combating Western influence in the 
Somalia and the Horn of Africa, in effect declaring other groups as inferior and in direct 
competition with al-Shabaab. Acting as the vanguard, al-Shabaab claims the authority to 
mobilize Muslims from not only the region, but from the global audience for the jihad 
against Western influence in the Horn of Africa. This is differentiated from the group 
identity and cohesion theme through al-Shabaab claiming a leadership role amongst 
Muslims and calling for Muslims to mobilize in support of jihad. 
6. Relevance  
The relevance theme is used to demonstrate durability and governance, in addition 
to claiming that Western concern over al-Shabaab actions prove the group is a relevant 
threat to Western influence and Western supported governments. Messages in this 
category reflect the need of al-Shabaab to not only demonstrate its military capacity and 
solidarity with Muslims, but also its ability to be “meaningful in the minds of its 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 37. 
60 Open Source Center, “Highlights of al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10–17 January 2013,” 18 
January 2013. 
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audience.”61  Most of messages in the relevance theme involve al-Shabaab demonstrating 
its ability to govern, particularly with providing services, collection and distribution of 
taxes, and instituting a legal system based on sharia.   
7. Religious Authority  
As a group promoting jihad to establish an Islamic state, al-Shabaab uses religious 
authority as a messaging theme. This theme seeks to highlight al-Shabaab as a religious 
organization that serves God’s will with holy warriors. Messages focused on directly 
linking the actions and philosophy with Islamic teachings fall into this category. Al-
Shabaab also claims authority through promoting religious seminars that the group 
conducts in areas under its control. Praising the martyrdom of fighters, particularly 
suicide bombers, also falls under this theme. The coding criteria for each theme with the 
theme’s corresponding desired effect are shown in Table 1. 
                                                 
61 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 35. 
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 Description of Western and regional media as corrupt 
 Accusing of Western and regional media of suppressing 
truth 
 Accusing Western and regional media of participating in 
“war on Islam” 
 Attempt to discredit Western or regional media 




 Critical of Western influence, foreign involvement in 
Somalia source of insecurity 
 Describing Somali government, AMISOM, and Western 
weakness and failures 
 Expressing illegitimacy of Somali and Regional 
government and Western institutions 
 AMISOM, Kenyan, and Ethiopian forces are an extension 
of Western influence 
 Areas controlled by foreign forces and the Somali 






 Al-Shabaab is a unified organization 
 Al-Shabaab is aligned with Somali clans and traditional 
leadership 
 Responding to and refuting reports of dissention within 
al-Shabaab 





 Boasting about al-Shabaab attacks 
 Describing battlefield victories 
 Threatening local rivals, Somali Government, AMISOM 






 Al-Shabaab is a competent vanguard of the Islamic 
movement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa; calls 
Muslims to action 
 Providing context to actions 




 Demonstrating durability and governance 
 Western actions against al-Shabaab prove the group is 





 Al-Shabaab serves God’s will 
 Al-Shabaab members are holy warriors 
 Responses to religious questions 





C. OBSERVABLE BEHAVIORS 
The themes listed above are designed to achieve the effects of mobilize for jihad 
and degrade support. For this study, both effects are analyzed through behaviors that can 
be observed to determine if the propaganda is achieving the desired effect. The 
observable behaviors for the mobilize for jihad effect are al-Shabaab inspired violence 
and arrests of al-Shabaab supporters outside of Somalia. To evaluate degrade support, 
protest and demonstrations were evaluated along with media products critical of 
AMISOM. The criteria for observable behaviors are listed below. 
1. Violence 
One observable behavior used to determine mobilization for jihad includes 
unattributed attacks against AMISOM forces, regional governments, or foreign entities 
within Somalia. Attacks attributed to al-Shabaab are not used since those attacks are self-
generated and not indicative of influencing action from the target audience. For this 
study, data from Somalia and the AMISCOM troop contributing countries of Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burundi, Uganda, and Sierra Leone was evaluated. Attacks that were 
unattributed to a particular actor, but related to an event not associated with Islamic 
extremism were excluded from the data. Examples include land disputes, common crime, 
and intertribal violence common to the countries studied. Suicide attacks attributed to al-
Shabaab are included as a behavior indicative of mobilizing for jihad. While suicide 
attacks are claimed by al-Shabaab, the process of radicalization and mobilization for 
conducting a suicide bombing requires a high degree of motivation and commitment to 
the cause for the bomber to carry out the mission.62 
2. Arrests and Indictments  
The last observable behavior related to mobilizing for jihad relates to arrests and 
indictments of al-Shabaab members by non-Somali governments. Data for arrests by 
African governments came from the ACLED database, with data regarding arrests and 
                                                 
62 Michael Bond, “The Making of a Suicide Bomber,” New Scientist 182 no. 2447 (Ma, 2004): 34–37. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/200349321?accountid=12702.  
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indictments from the United States coming from the Department of Justice press releases. 
Arrests take priority over indictments in that indictments are only included if issued 
during the timeframe of the study, and the indicted person is not already arrested.   
3. Protests and Demonstrations  
Under degrade support, anti-government protests in Somalia and the AMISOM 
troop contributing countries are determined through the ACLED database.    Similar to 
judging attacks against Somali and regional governments, protests will be judged against 
the context of its environment. Protests in Somalia that are related to a specific issue, 
such as the land dispute between Puntland and Somaliland over the Sol, Sanaag, and 
Cayn regions is excluded from the study. Al-Shabaab has not been involved in, or 
commented on that conflict between the autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland. 
Protests against the Somali constitution, Somali elections, and the Puntland President’s 
extended term in office are included in the data since those issues are directly contested 
by al-Shabaab.   
4. Critical Media 
Opposition and criticism towards the AMISOM mission and foreign involvement 
in Somalia published in media sources not attributed to al-Shabaab are also observed 
behaviors for degraded support. This data was obtained through searching over 1,500 
media products from the Open Source center over the study’s timeframe for content 
critical of AMISOM’s performance, or critical of AMISOM’s presence and mission in 
Somalia. Criticism of AMISOM includes media products highlighting abuses against 
Somali citizens, reports of civilian casualties, reports of corruption, and media reports in 
which AMISOM officials are responding to criticism. The relationship between effects 





Table 2.   Observed behaviors and effects relationship 
 Effects 
Mobilize for Jihad Degrade Support  
Observed 
Behaviors 
Number of suicide attacks in 
Somalia and AMISOM troop 
contributing countries 
Anti-government protests in Somalia 
and AMISOM troop contributing 
countries 
Arrests and indictments, killing of 
al-Shabaab members by non-Somali 
governments. 
Non-al-Shabaab media products 
advocating for withdrawal of 
AMISOM forces from Somalia 
Unattributed attacks against 
AMISOM, Somali, regional 




A. PROPAGANDA THEMES 
In the timeframe of this study (2011-2013), al-Shabaab’s propaganda was 
predominantly focused on the themes of operational capacity and narrative, with those 
two themes respectively representing 38 and 31 percent of the group’s propaganda 
output. The remainder of the propaganda output consisted of group identity and cohesion 
at eight percent, relevance at eight percent, strategic authority at seven percent, religious 
authority at five percent, and competing voices at three percent. Figure 1 shows the 




Figure 1.  Al-Shabaab Propaganda Theme Frequency 
When evaluating each theme over time, operational capacity and narrative 
consistently appeared in al-Shabaab propaganda during the timeframe of this study, with 
periodic peaks in theme prevalence. The remaining five themes appeared less frequently 
with respect to time, and in smaller quantities. Graphical representations of frequencies 
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for the propaganda themes corresponding to the desired effects of mobilize for jihad and 
degrade support are demonstrated in figures 2 and 3.    
 
 
Figure 2.  Mobilize for Jihad Theme Frequency 
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Figure 3.  Degrade Support Theme Frequency 
For the narrative theme, four peaks in theme frequency are observed. These peaks 
correspond to al-Shabaab attempting to capitalize on propaganda opportunities presented 
by its adversaries. On February 3, 2012 al-Shabaab’s Radio Andalus had discussed a 
variety of topics to include the crash of a supposed spy plane in the Badbaado 1 refugee 
camp outside of Mogadishu, looting by Ethiopian forces, and infighting amongst Somali 
forces.63  That same week, al-Shabaab discussed the upcoming London conference on 
Somalia as a conspiracy against the Somali paper through outlining plans obtained from 
“documents linked to the Italian government,” which was also a former colonizer of 
Somalia.64  Other peaks in narrative frequency include capitalizing on the defection of an 
Ethiopian sniper via twitter in May 2012, mocking the Somali government after a plane 
delivering weapons caught fire at the Mogadishu airport in early August 2013, followed 
                                                 
63 Open Source Center, “Program Summary: Baydhabo Radio Andalus in Somali 1100 GMT 03 Feb 
12,” https://opensource.gov.  
64 Open Source Center, “Al-Shabaab Finds Document Revealing Plans by European Nations for 
Somalia,” https://opensource.gov.  
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by criticism of Western response to Syrian chemical weapons use in late August 2013.65  
The frequency of the narrative theme over time is shown in Figure 4. 
The operational capacity theme is the most consistently represented theme 
throughout the timeframe studied, particularly since al-Shabaab continually broadcast 
both large and small attacks against its enemies to demonstrate the group’s capabilities to 
its audience.66  The largest peak in frequency corresponds to a series of attacks conducted 
between July 19–25 in Somalia and Kenya during the holy month of Ramadan. Al-
Shabaab claimed a series of  explosions during the evening of 24 July to “expel the 
apostate militias, Somali Government soldier (sic), from residential areas,” in addition to 
assassinations of various TFG and AMISOM officials in Mogadishu during that same 
timeframe.67  Other peaks correspond to the attack on the Westgate Mall from 22–24 
September; coordinated attacks against Ethiopian, Kenyan, and TFG forces between 
December 2011 and January 2012; the twin suicide bombing of the Somali constitutional 
assembly in August 2012; and the attempted assassination of the Somali interior minister 
in May 2013.68 
The five remaining themes appeared far less often than narrative and operational 
capacity, with the less common themes prevalent around specific events. Group identity 
and cohesion appeared the most frequently among the less common themes, comprising 
eight percent of al-Shabaab’s propaganda output. The significant peaks of this theme 
occur in February-March 2012, June 2012, and August 2013. The highest peaks from 
February-March 2012 correspond to al-Shabaab’s formal merger with al-Qaeda and 
                                                 
65 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 17–24 May 2012,” “Highlights 
of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 8 - 14 Aug 2013,” “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 29 
August - 4 September 2013,” https://opensource.gov.    
66 Melegrou-Hitchens, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy,” 37. 
67 Open Source Center, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Claims Responsibility for Mogadishu ‘Explosions,’” 
https://opensource.gov.  
68 Open Source Center, “Somalia’s Al-Shabaab Terms Mogadishu Twin Suicide Attacks as 
Successful,”  “Program Summary: Baydhabo Radio Andalus in Somali 1100 GMT 12 Jan 12,” “Program 
Summary: Andalus Radio in Somali 0500 GMT 22 September 13,” https://opensource.gov.  
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responding to claims of a falling out with Omar Hammami.69  The peak in June 2012 
corresponds with the announcement of a series of alliances with Hubeyr and Hawiye clan 
elders in the Bay and Bakool regions of Somalia.70  Following June 2012, this theme 
maintains a low level of occurrence until October 2013 as al-Shabaab expresses solidarity 
with the protestors facing Egyptian security forces in Cairo.71   
The relevance theme occurred slightly less than group identity and cohesion, 
comprising seven percent of al-Shabaab’s propaganda output. The peaks between July 
and September 2012 represent an increased emphasis on al-Shabaab’s ability to control 
the population and demonstrate governance during Kenya’s advance on Kismayo. In July 
2012 al-Shabaab claimed executing three men for allegedly spying for British and 
American intelligence agencies, implicating the men in the death of Bilal al-Berjawi from 
a drone strike.72  This is later followed in August 2012 by a spike in messaging 
demonstrating al-Shabaab’s ability to provide services through provision of food and 
agricultural aid in areas under its control.73  In September 2012 al-Shabaab continues to 
propagate messages demonstrating its ability to govern through a series of messages 
claiming to still be in control of Kismayo, before finally tweeting “Last night, after more 
than 5 years the Islamic administration in #Kismayo closed its offices.”74  After the fall 
of Kismayo, al-Shabaab has a series of messages revoking permits for distributing 
humanitarian aid from Islamic Relief for failure to comply with policies from al-
                                                 
69 Open Source Center, “OSC Summary -- Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10 - 16 Feb 
2012,” “OSC Summary -- Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 15–22 Mar,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
70 Open Source Center, “Program Summary: Kismaayo Radio Andalus 1030 GMT 20 Jun 12,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
71 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 15 - 21 August 2013,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
72 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 19–25 July 2012,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
73 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10–16 August 2012,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
74 Open Source Center, “Al-Shabaab, KDF Spokesman Post Updates on Kismaayo Situation: 27 Sep - 
3 Oct 2012,” https://opensource.gov.  
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Shabaab’s Office for Supervising the Affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA).75  From this 
point, the relevance theme is absent for three months before appearing again at low levels 
regarding al-Shabaab’s role in arbitrating clan disputes.76   
The frequencies of the remaining low-density themes of strategic authority, 
religious authority, and competing voices are shown in Figure 4. The most common 
theme in this group is strategic authority, with the largest peak in occurrence coinciding 
with the Westgate Mall attack. During the siege on the mall, al-Shabaab made a 
deliberate effort to portray the attack as a response to the Kenyan occupation of southern 
Somalia and demand the withdrawal of Kenyan forces.77   Competing voices also peaked 
in prevalence during the Westgate attack, with al-Shabaab admonishing regional and 
Western media outlets to verify information through al-Shabaab instead of spreading 
false information and rumors from “unreliable” sources such as speculating on the 
nationality of the attackers.78   Other peaks in activity for competing voices are centered 
around a December 2011 Twitter exchange with the spokesman for the Kenyan Defense 
Forces, and criticizing the independent media outlet Somali Memo over a supposed 
March 2012 interview of al-Shabaab leader Shaykh Mukhtar Robow.79  The main peak in 
for religious authority is focused on the end of Ramadan in August 2012 with al-Shabaab 
commenting on Eid festivals and praying for martyrs.80  Heightened messaging during 
religious celebrations is also displayed with al-Shabaab praising pilgrims during the Eid-
al Adha celebrations in Mecca in October 2012.81 
                                                 
75 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 4 - 10 Oct 2012,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
76 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10 - 17 January 2013,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
77 Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al Shabab’s Media Strategy,” 3 
78 Open Source Center, “Somalia: Twitter Suspends Fifth Al-Shabaab Account for Posting Details of 
Nairobi Mall Siege,” https://opensource.gov.  
79 Open Source Center, “OSC Summary -- Al-Shabaab, Kenyan Military Spokesman Engage in 
Twitter Debate,” “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 22 - 29 Mar 2012,” https://opensource.gov.  
80 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 17–23 August 2012,” 
https://opensource.gov.  




Figure 4.  Low Density Theme Frequency 
B. PROPAGANDA SOURCES 
 Analysis of the two sources of propaganda featured in this study 
demonstrates the occurrence of radio and Twitter output over time. Figure 5 shows al-
Shabaab’s Radio Andalus program was more prolific than Twitter through October 2012. 
Following October 2012, Twitter activity remained consistent, with a significant 
reduction in Radio output. This drop in activity from Radio Andalus coincides with 
Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) capturing Kismayo from al-Shabaab at the end of 
September 2012.82  The Open Source Center reported that there was no activity from 
Radio Andalus after al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from Kismayo, to include Internet 
broadcasts on the website http://calamada.com, which regularly streamed Radio Andalus 
broadcasts from Somalia.83  Activity from Radio Andalus did not pick up again until 
January 2013, resuming at a much lower level than before the KDF capture of Kismayo. 
                                                 
82 “Somalia Islamist Abandon Kismayo Amid AU Attack,” BBC News Africa, September 29, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19769058.  
83 Open Source Center, “FYI -- Al-Shabaab-Owned Radio Andalus Off Air Since 27 Sep,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
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The one spike in Radio Andalus output occurred in mid-January 2013, with the failed 
rescue attempt of the French hostage Denis Allex in Bulo Mareer, which al-Shabaab 
capitalized on to claim victory in repelling the attack and to demonstrate its own authority 
through statements declaring al-Shabaab controls Allex’s fate.84  Even with the 
reappearance of Radio Andalus in early 2013, the propaganda output did not return to 
pre-October 2012 levels until September 2013. This increase corresponds with the suicide 
attack on a popular Mogadishu restaurant that killed 15 people on September 7, 2013 and 
continued through the Westgate attack.85 
 
Figure 5.  Propaganda Source Comparison 
 
As shown in Figure 5, Twitter output remained fairly constant, with the most 
pronounced spike in activity corresponding to the Westgate Mall attack in September 
                                                 
84 Edward Cody, “France Fails to Free Intelligence Agent Held Captive in Somalia,” The Washington 
Post, January 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/hostage-in-somalia-killed-during-french-
rescue-attempt/2013/01/12/963c42e2-5cae-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9530eb9_story.html.  
85 Abdirahman Hussein and Abdi Sheikh, “Al Shabaab Bombers Strike Mogadishu Restaurant, 15 
Dead,” Reuters, September 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/07/us-somalia-blasts-
idUSBRE98607I20130907.  
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2013. Since al-Shabaab primarily tweeted in English and had a broad reach to Western 
and Kenyan audiences, Twitter was the platform of choice for al-Shabaab to exploit its 
actions at the Westgate Mall.86  By using the microblogging site, al-Shabaab was able to 
provide constant updates on the siege to the public and news media, communicate 
demands on the Kenyan government, and issue threats of additional attacks should 
demands remain unfulfilled.87  Through “live-tweeting” the attack and holding out 
against the KDF for four days, al-Shabaab showed the capability to manipulate 
perceptions regarding the Kenyan response through confusing, if not outright 
undermining the Kenyan narrative.  
An interesting feature of al-Shabaab’s Twitter activity is how quickly it tapered 
off following the Westgate siege. During the week following the siege, al-Shabaab 
continued to mock the Kenyan response to the attack by tweeting “A week after 
#Westgate, the Kenyan govt (sic) and Western intelligence officials failed to uncover the 
facts & details of the Westgate Operation.”88  This tweet was followed by a tweet in 
Arabic vowing to avenge the “perpetrators of oppression and aggression,” with another 
tweet containing a link to a Swahili praise song threatening jihad against Kenya for 
oppressing Muslims.89  Shortly after posting the threats, al-Shabaab’s Twitter account 
was suspended for violating Twitter’s terms and conditions, which was the sixth time al-
Shabaab’s account was suspended for the same reason.90  Following the suspension, al-
Shabaab went silent on Twitter, while resuming levels of Radio Andalus output not seen 
since before the KDF liberated Kismayo. Twitter activity was not observed until 
December 16, 2013, with al-Shabaab activating its seventh account and declaring “with 
renewed vitality, the 140-character journalistic guerrilla warfare continues to challenge 
the mainstream Western narrative #Jihadnalism (sic).”   
                                                 
86 Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabaab’s Media Strategy,” 3. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 27 September - 3 October 
2013,” https://opensource.gov.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Open Source Center, “OSC Observation -- Twitter Suspends Sixth Al-Shabaab Account,” 
https://opensource.gov.  
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The suspensions of six different Twitter accounts had a significant impact on al-
Shabaab’s ability to directly reach people through its propaganda. Al-Shabaab’s Twitter 
followers were observed on a weekly basis staring January 4, 2012, when the group had a 
followership of 7,538.91  The observed followership of al-Shabaab’s account 
@HSMPress peaked at 21,524 on January 23, 2013 before the first account was 
suspended on January 25, 2013 after al-Shabaab posted pictures of a dead French soldier 
from the failed Denis Allex rescue and threatened to execute two Kenyan hostages if the 
Kenyan government failed to meet demands.92   Ironically, it was the aftermath of the 
failed Denis Allex rescue that saw the largest jump in Twitter followership, with al-
Shabaab gaining 3,511 followers from January 10–17, 2013.93 
Al-Shabaab was active on Twitter within two weeks of the @HSMPress 
suspension, but never gained the followership it had prior to January 2013. The new 
account, @HSMPRESS1 steadily gained followership from the initial observation of 
1,945 followers on February 7, 2013.94  Without a sensational story to capitalize on, 
followership peaked at 6,083 on September 4, 2013 before @HSMPRESS1 was 
suspended for threatening the U.S. and Somali presidents.95  Al-Shabaab had its third 
account functional in time for the anniversary of the September 11
th
 attacks, with 927 
followers on @HSM_Press.96  This account did not have the same amount of time as the 
previous accounts to gather followers before the Westgate attack, which came only 10 
days after activation.   
                                                 
91 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 3 - 12 Jan 2012.” January 13, 
2012, https://opensource.gov.  
92 Open Source Center, “Twitter Suspends Al-Shabaab Account; User Reaction Mixed.” January 25, 
2013, https://opensource.gov.  
93 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10 - 17 January 2013.” January 
18, 2013, https://opensource.gov.  
94 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 3 - 7 Feb 2013.” February 7, 
2013, https://opensource.gov.  
95 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 29 August - 4 September 
2013.” September 5, 2013, https://opensource.gov.   
96 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 10 - 11 September 2013.”  
September 12, 2013, https://opensource.gov.  
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During the Westgate siege, al-Shabaab used four different accounts with Twitter 
shutting down al-Shabaab accounts on an almost daily basis. Through the multiple 
account suspensions, al-Shabaab followership remained between 1,300-1,400 followers 
throughout the siege, limiting the group’s ability to directly reach followers, and in turn 
have followers interact with the group.97  Figure 6 shows that following the Westgate 
attack, al-Shabaab did regain followership once its account stabilized, reaching 5,779 
followers.98  The rise in followers was short lived, with al-Shabaab using Twitter to call 
for jihad against Kenya and vowing to “avenge perpetrators of oppression and 
aggression,” resulting in the account being suspended.99 
 
Figure 6.   Al-Shabaab Twitter Followers 
                                                 
97 Open Source Center, “OSC Observation -- Al-Shabaab Allegedly Launches New Twitter Account.” 
September 23, 2013, https://opensource.gov.  
98 Open Source Center, “Highlights of Al-Shabaab’s Twitter Account: 27 September - 3 October 
2013,” October 3, 2013, https://opensource.gov.  
99 Open Source Center, “OSC Observation -- Twitter Suspends Sixth Al-Shabaab Account,” October 
4, 2013, https://opensource.gov.  
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C. THEMES BY SOURCES 
When comparing the prevalence of themes by the source of propaganda, the ratio 
of themes from Radio Andalus is similar to the total theme occurrence shown in Figure 1. 
Twitter follows a different pattern than Radio Andalus with regards to which themes are 
more prevalent. Operational capacity and narrative are still top two themes with religious 
authority and competing voices as the two least common themes; however strategic 
authority moved from the third lest common theme to the third most common theme 
ahead of group identity and cohesion as shown in Figure 7.   
 
Figure 7.   Theme Prevalence by Source 
Strategic authority appeared approximately the same number of times on Radio 
Andalus as Twitter (100 and 97 times, respectively), though the appearance of the theme 
comprised nine percent of Twitter messaging – compared to six percent of Radio Andalus 
messaging, and seven percent of total messaging. Figure 8 compares the strategic 
authority theme over time between Radio Andalus and Twitter. Radio Andalus was the 
primary means of disseminating the strategic authority theme until August 2012, when 
the KDF was advancing on Kismayo. The aggregate frequency of the strategic authority 
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theme didn’t necessarily increase following al-Shabaab’s departure from Kismayo, but 
with Radio Andalus off the air al-Shabaab used Twitter more often to communicate the 
strategic authority theme. The largest spike predictably coincided with the Westgate 
attack as al-Shabaab used Twitter to provide the strategic context behind the attack. 
Following Westgate and the suspension of al-Shabaab’s sixth Twitter account, Radio 
Andalus again became the primary means of dissemination. 
 
Figure 8.   Strategic Authority Theme Comparison 
Another interesting observation in theme occurrence involves the least common 
theme for both sources – competing voices. While only comprising three percent of total 
propaganda output, the competing voices theme is overwhelmingly represented through 
Twitter messaging as shown in Figure 7. This theme comprises five percent of Twitter 
messaging compared to barely half-percent of Radio Andalus messaging. Figure 9 shows 
the predominance of Twitter as the platform of choice for competing voices, with the 
largest spikes in the theme coinciding with Twitter exchanges between al-Shabaab and 
the KDF spokesman MAJ Chirchir, responding to the supposed Somali Memo interview 
of Shaykh Mukhtar Robow, and criticizing Western media coverage of the Westgate 
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attack. This indicates al-Shabaab sees Twitter as an effective tool to directly engage 
external audiences, especially when trying to establish credibility or attempting to 
discredit information propagated by others. The almost non-existent use of the competing 
voices theme on Radio Andalus indicates al-Shabaab places a lower priority on 
countering competing media or establishing credibility with local audiences. By closing 
competing radio stations, confiscating televisions and satellite dishes, and intimidating 
journalists in areas under its control, al-Shabaab is able to tightly control information 
content without having to contend with opposing media.100 
 
Figure 9.  Competing Voices Theme Comparison 
D. BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 
Trends in behavior are shown in Figure 10. The overwhelming majority of 
observed behaviors were attacks, with the attacks predominately occurring in Somalia 
                                                 
100 David Conrad, Andrea Crossan, “How Al-Shabaab is Creating a Media Empire and Creating 
Chaos in Kenya,” Public Radio International, June 27, 2014, http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-27/how-
al-shabab-building-media-empire-and-creating-chaos-kenya.  
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against AMISOM forces, Somali Army, or Somali police forces – with attacks in Kenya 
coming in a distant second. Attacks stayed consistently high compared to the other 
behaviors, with two noticeable decreases in activity. The decreases in attacks ironically 
correspond to defeats suffered by al-Shabaab. The first significant decrease in May 2012 
is when AMISOM forces ousted al-Shabaab from the Daynile district outside of 
Mogadishu.101  Following the capture of Daynile by AMISOM, attacks rose again, hitting 
a peak during the KDF advance on Kismayo, before falling again once the KDF secured 
Kismayo at the end of September 2012. Attacks picked up again soon thereafter, 
maintaining a steady pace with a peak from July through August 2013, which 
corresponds with Ramadan that year.   
Another notable behavior is protests, with peaks in activity in July 2012 and 
February -March 2013. Interestingly, the spikes in protest activity do not correlate with 
any mass movement. The closest any peak comes to an organized social phenomenon is 
in July 2012, Muslims in Addis Ababa protested over the Ethiopian government’s anti-
Islamic policies. The protest in Ethiopia remained fairly consistent throughout the 
duration of the study, which indicates a peak in protest activity would be the result of an 
uptick in protest in other areas covering other topics. The remainder of protest were 
predominately in Somalia, and covered a wide variety of topics from the distribution of 
food aid, formation of a Jubbaland state, and the extension of the Puntland president’s 
term in office – with no one topic showing predominance over the others during any 
given time during the peaks in protest activity. 
                                                 
101 Mohammed Yusuf, “Al-Shabaab Radio Station off the Air in Somali Capital,” May 24, 2012,   
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Figure 10.   Behavior Data 
One more interesting behavior concerns the prevalence of critical media. 
Throughout most of the study, the level of critical media stayed low, especially when 
compared to attacks and protests. However, from July through September 2013, there 
was an increase in media criticizing AMISOM. During this time there were increased 
demands for the withdrawal of the KDF from Somalia by Somali government officials 
due to the KDF playing partisan clan politics in Kismayo and arresting senior Somali 
Army officers.102  Accusations of corruption and theft of food aid were also leveled 
against the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) contingent of AMISOM during this 
time, resulting in investigations and the removal of UPDF commanders.103 
                                                 
102 Hiiraan Online, “Somali Minister Calls for Expulsion of AMISOM from Kismayo,” July 1, 2013, 
http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2013/July/30103/somali_minister_calls_for_expulsion_of_amisom_from_k
ismayo.aspx#sthash.rvV23Me0.dpbs . 




E. DATA ANALYSIS 
To understand the effectiveness of al-Shabaab’s propaganda requires an 
evaluation of the relationship between propaganda themes, behaviors, and desired effects. 
Effects are indicative of behaviors, with each effect being the aggregate of the 
corresponding behaviors listed in Table 2. Behaviors are in turn influenced by 
propaganda designed to produce the desired effect. Statistical analysis using quasi-
Poisson regression was used to separately evaluate the relationships between effects and 
total propaganda, effects and individual themes, and behaviors with themes. This allows 
effectiveness to be evaluated from a macro level with the aggregated behaviors and 
propaganda themes down a micro level to determine which specific themes affected 
specific behaviors.  
Overall Effectiveness 
The first relationship evaluated was the effectiveness of the propaganda themes 
designed to degrade support for Somali and regional governments and the AMISOM 
mission. There was no significant statistical relationship between the propaganda and 
aggregated behaviors related to degrade support. Since behaviors that contribute to 
effects do not change instantaneously with propaganda dissemination, the statistical 
relationship was evaluated from one through four weeks to determine the effect of 
propaganda on support. Interestingly, even when taking time into consideration, there 
was no statistical relationship between propaganda designed to degrade support and the 
desired effect, suggesting that al-Shabaab’s efforts to decrease support for its adversaries 
is having no cumulative effect. 
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Degrade Support Weekly Effects 
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When disaggregating the themes related to degrading support, the relevance 
theme sticks out as being more significant than the others as shown in Table 4. The theme 
shows significance in the first, third, and fourth weeks, indicating that there is a quick 
impact when al-Shabaab stresses relevance in its propaganda, with effectiveness lasting 
several weeks. The second week only had weak negative significance for relevance. 
Propaganda stressing relevance is not beneficial for al-Shabaab though, with a negative 
statistical relationship indicating that al-Shabaab’s efforts at demonstrating durability and 
the ability to govern is counterproductive towards degrading support to the group’s 
adversaries.   
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Degrade Support Weekly Effects 
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Compared to the degrade support effect, aggregated propaganda themes related to 
mobilize for jihad did have statistical significance as shown in Table 5. The data 
demonstrates a negative relationship between al-Shabaab’s propaganda and the desired 
effect, indicating that al-Shabaab’s efforts to use propaganda to mobilize supporters for 
jihad is counterproductive. Propaganda designed to mobilize al-Shabaab’s audience for 
jihad has a quick and enduring relationship with effects, showing significance from one 











Mobilize for Jihad Weekly Effects 
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Evaluation of the individual themes related to mobilize for jihad show a greater 
number of themes having a statistical significance over time than with the degrade 
support effect. Table 6 shows the statistical significance for each theme intended to 
increase mobilization for jihad. Three out of four themes for mobilize for jihad showed a 
statistically significant impact on behavior change within four weeks. Group identity and 
cohesion and operational capacity have a negative impact towards the effect, with 





These results suggest that al-Shabaab propaganda stressing operational capacity 
or group identity and cohesion is statistically ineffective and even counterproductive. The 
theme that had the most consistent impact was group identity and cohesion with 
significance from one to four weeks, suggesting an immediate and lasting negative 
impact for al-Shabaab highlighting unity with other militant movements and Somali 
clans. Operational capacity has a similar relationship, indicating that behaviors associated 
with mobilization for jihad decreased after three weeks of highlighting operational 
success and issuing threats, with weak significance in the second week. Conversely, 
strategic authority has a positive relationship with mobilize for jihad, suggesting that 
directly calling Muslims to action is more effective than expressing solidarity with other 
jihadi groups or demonstrating military prowess.   




Mobilize for Jihad by Weeks 
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A comparison of Twitter and Radio Andalus highlights the difference medium has 
on the effectiveness of a message. Each effect was evaluated separately to determine the 
statistical relationship based on theme and method of delivery. Since effects were most 
consistently seen at four weeks, further evaluation of effectiveness disaggregated by 
sources considered effects at a 28 day rolling average for theme occurrence.  
For the degrade support effect, the source of propaganda primarily mirrors trends 
already observed, with themes disseminated by Radio and Twitter largely insignificant 
towards the degrade support effect and its associated behaviors. The only theme having a 
strong impact on degrade support via Twitter is narrative, which has a significant positive 
impact on protest and the overall effect, with a weak significance towards critical media. 
This shows that al-Shabaab’s denigration of Western influence and foreign involvement 
in Somalia does have a statistical effect on generating protest, and contributed towards 
generating a positive impact towards the overall effect. The only other theme exhibiting 
any significance is competing voices, which did not reach the five percent significance 
level for this study. 
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Table 7.   Twitter Effects on Degrade Support 
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Total Twitter Volume -0.029 -0.030 -0.025 
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Radio also exhibits a low impact on the degrade support effect and behaviors, 
with the only theme having an effect being competing voices. As shown in Table 10, 
competing voices has a significant positive impact on media critical of AMISOM and 
weakly negative significance towards protests against regional adversaries. This is 
interesting since Radio Andalus primarily reaches local audiences in Somalia and 
competing voices was less than one percent of total output through Radio Andalus. In 
addition, competing voices focused on countering the narrative of Western and regional 
media that criticized al-Shabaab. Since al-Shabaab controlled the media in areas where 
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Radio Andalus broadcast, there was little to no media competition for the group to 
counter.104   
Al-Shabaab focused the vast majority of its effort toward competing voices 
through Twitter, though the few instances of this theme appearing on radio did 
correspond with a spike in protests and critical media in late 2013. While able to 
significantly influence critical media, competing voices had no statistical influence on the 
overall desired effect of degrade support. Aside from competing voices, there were no 
other themes exhibiting any significant relationship towards behavior or the accumulated 
effect, indicating that radio was a largely ineffective medium for degrading support to al-
Shabaab’s adversaries. 
                                                 
104 Somalia Report, “Al-Shabaab’s Media Outlet,” 
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3485/Al-Shabaabs_Media_Outlets.  
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Table 8.   Radio Effects on Degrade Support 
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Degrade Support Media Protests 
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Compared to degrade support, Twitter primarily has a significantly positive 
impact on the behaviors associated with mobilize for jihad as exhibited in Table 9, which 
is remarkably different from the combined impact of al-Shabaab propaganda using both 
sources highlighted in Table 6. 
All Twitter themes, with the exception of group cohesion and identity, had a 
significant positive relationship towards the overall effect of mobilize for jihad. This 
same pattern emerged when evaluating Twitter themes against violence, indicating that 
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Twitter was an effective means for al-Shabaab to incite violence and mobilize its 
audience for jihad. Conversely, Twitter was an ineffective medium to influence arrests, 
with strategic authority being counterproductive towards this behavior. Arrests are an 
indirect means to observe al-Shabaab activity outside of Somalia’s borders, so the 
negative relationship between strategic authority and arrests could indicate fewer al-
Shabaab sympathizers being caught outside of Somalia either conducting operations or 
traveling to join the group in Somalia. With Twitter being al-Shabaab’s primary 
instrument to disseminate information to a global audience, a lack of activity outside of 
Somalia could be an indicator of declining influence among foreigners prone to jihad.   
Interestingly, the strategic authority theme and group identity and cohesion theme 
have opposite effects towards violence and mobilization for jihad on Twitter. This 
indicates al-Shabaab is having some effectiveness at inciting violence through advertising 
al-Shabaab as a vanguard against foreign occupation – but the same theme has the 
opposite effect outside Somalia’s borders. Conversely, expressing unity with the global 
Muslim community, Somali clans, and other jihadi movements is counterproductive at 
influencing violence and advancing the mobilize for jihad effect. Potential explanations 
for this disparity could be that the two themes resonate differently between Somali and 
non-Somali audiences in regards to answering the call to jihad or accepting solidarity 
with the global jihad movement – which is unpopular among Somalis.105   
The last interesting statistic regarding Twitter’s effects on mobilize for jihad are 
the effect total Twitter volume has on mobilization. Volume has a significant negative 
effect on violence, with weak significance towards arrests and the overall effect. This 
indicates that while individual themes may have a positive impact on increasing al-
Shabaab inspired violence; Twitter’s combined volume has a statistically deleterious 
effect on violence and a weak negative effect on mobilize for jihad. 
                                                 
105 Thomas, “Exposing the Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab,” 418. 
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Table 9.   Twitter Effects on Mobilize for Jihad 
 
Twitter Effects on Mobilize for Jihad 
 
Mobilize for Jihad Violence Arrests 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
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By comparison, the same themes disseminated through Radio Andalus are largely 
insignificant, with the exception of strategic authority. Table 12 shows that strategic 
authority is the only theme with a significant statistical relationship with mobilize for 
jihad and its associated behaviors. The effect on violence and arrests remains the same as 
Twitter, however the overall relationship towards mobilize for jihad on Radio Andalus is 
the opposite of Twitter. The opposing results between violence and arrests could be an 
indicator that a local audience may answer the call to action from al-Shabaab, with the 
 52 
ensuing violence hindering sympathizer activity outside of Somalia due to increased 
security measures. Since radio is a more localized method of propaganda and prone to 
inactivity as seen in Figure 5, the negative effects of the strategic authority theme on 
sympathizers outside of Somalia are magnified, giving strategic authority a negative 
relationship with the overall mobilize for jihad effect.   
Overall, the difference between Radio Andalus and Twitter seen in the mobilize 
for jihad effect is indicative of how consistently al-Shabaab made use of each propaganda 
source. As demonstrated in Figure 5, al-Shabaab stayed fairly consistent with Twitter 
propaganda throughout the course of this study, with the only significant absence of 
Twitter in the last three months of the study – after the Westgate attack. By contrast, 
Radio Andalus was fairly prolific prior to the fall of Kismayo, but only had intermittent 
broadcasts between October 2012 and September 2013. The lack of output would 
certainly affect the ability of Radio Andalus to be effective at influencing behavior since 
the radio station would have to actually broadcast to have the opportunity to be effective. 
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Table 10.    Radio Effects on Mobilize for Jihad 
 
Radio Effects on Mobilize for Jihad 
 
Mobilize for Jihad Violence Arrests 
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These results show that the statistical effectiveness of al-Shabaab propaganda 
varies by the theme and the manner in which it is disseminated. Al-Shabaab’s overall 
propaganda efforts are statistically ineffective at generating the effects of degrade 
support, and counterproductive for mobilize for jihad. The effectiveness of the 
aggregated themes toward the desired effects does not tell the entire story though, and 
requires a nuanced review of how themes interact with effects and behaviors over 
different mediums. When taking a deeper look at how individual themes impact desired 
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effects and associated behaviors, the overall effectiveness of al-Shabaab’s propaganda is 
shown to be a complicated amalgamation of the individual parts that don’t necessarily 
create a coherent pattern. 
Within a desired effect, propaganda themes can affect associated behaviors 
differently— sometimes with opposing results. This is particularly true when evaluating 
al-Shabaab’s mobilize for jihad effect Overall effectiveness was dependent upon the 
medium used, with strategic authority being effective on Twitter and counterproductive 
on Radio Andalus. When the mediums are aggregated together, strategic authority has an 
overall positive effect on mobilize for jihad, suggesting that Twitter is the stronger 
medium for propaganda. Conversely, group identity and cohesion has a negative 
relationship via Twitter for violence with a positive overall effect on mobilize for jihad, 
with no effectiveness via Radio Andalus. As the sources are aggregated, the same theme 
has no effect on individual behaviors, but does have an overall negative impact on the 
overall mobilize for jihad effect. Similar to strategic authority, the group identity and 
cohesion theme suggests that Twitter is the more effective means for mobilize for jihad. 
These Twitter results don’t readily translate into overall effects amongst all 
themes though. For example, the operational capacity’s significant positive relationship 
in Twitter is not sustained when the sources are aggregated, having a negative impact for 
the overall effect. Religious authority exhibits similar behavior with a positive overall 
effect through Twitter, but is insignificant when propaganda sources are combined – 
indicating that while Twitter may be the stronger medium for communicating some 
propaganda themes, this is not so for all for all themes. 
The variables that affect how a particular propaganda theme contributes to a 
behavior or desired effect are diverse and hard to identify as shown above. Particular 
themes may resonate stronger than others, may be better suited to a particular medium, or 
carry different weight in regards to certain behaviors within a desired effect. One theme 
that has a positive effect over Twitter could end up having an overall negative effect 
when also propagated over radio. Other factors that affect propaganda performance 
include the audience, message content, competition from adversaries, and frequency of 
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dissemination. At a minimum, propaganda needs to reach a large enough audience, be 
repeated, and be credible to have a positive effect for al-Shabaab.106   
Social media platforms like Twitter have the potential to meet these criteria since 
it is a publically available service that allows free and anonymous access to both al-
Shabaab and its followers from anywhere in the world.107  Twitter demonstrates promise 
for al-Shabaab’s propaganda, with a significant impact on the mobilize for jihad desired 
effect when used to propagate messages with the strategic authority theme. Conversely, 
al-Shabaab’s use of Twitter for group identity and cohesion was counterproductive, 
showing that social media can hurt as well as help.   
Data analysis should be evaluated carefully since the relationship between 
propaganda and behavior cannot be solely defined through statistical correlation. Using 
the Westgate attack as an example, there was a spike in the strategic authority on Twitter 
during the attack as seen in Figure 8. Statistically speaking, al-Shabaab’s Twitter use 
during the siege could be interpreted as effective according to the data in tables 6 and 9 
that show strategic authority as having a positive statistical relationship with the mobilize 
for jihad effect and associated behaviors. This supports qualitative analysis conducted on 
al-Shabaab’s media strategy following the attack, which primarily focused on the attack 
being a catalyst for al-Shabaab to effectively use social media.108 Since this study is a 
cumulative evaluation over time instead of a case study of an isolated incident like 
Westgate, using statistical analysis to draw conclusions about the success of al-Shabaab’s 
media strategy is perilous. This analysis is one tool to inform the overall judgment of an 
event like Westgate, and must be combined with other data to that provides further 
context and substance to the analysis.  
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Further insight into Twitter effectiveness during the Westgate siege is found 
through study of overall Twitter activity during the attack.   Other studies demonstrate al-
Shabaab’s Twitter activity was a small percentage of total activity compared to tweets 
from other actors. Tweets relating to threats, religion, terrorism, and distrust of the 
government were a tiny fraction of Twitter content during the siege, indicating al-
Shabaab’s message was drowned out by the larger volume of content not related to its 
narrative.109  While al-Shabaab’s propaganda themes were only minor mentions during 
the Westgate attack, the group itself was mentioned in 23.4 percent of tweets about 
Westgate, providing notoriety and amplifying the group’s message through media 
attention.110   
This higher level of exposure is expected from a spectacular attack that attracts 
international attention; however this exposure had mixed results in advancing al-
Shabaab’s narrative as seen with the small representation of al-Shabaab Twitter content 
combined with effectiveness through statistical analysis. Despite being a small 
representation of total Twitter activity, the strategic authority theme was still effective for 
al-Shabaab, but was counteracted by operational capacity’s negative effects. Repeated 
suspensions of al-Shabaab’s Twitter account could have also had a negative impact on al-
Shabaab’s Twitter effectiveness. Narrative was effective for degrading support through 
Twitter, but that effectiveness diminished when aggregated with other sources and 
themes also present in the information environment. Unlike the limited success observed 
for the mobilize for jihad effect, there were no sustained effects from Twitter for degrade 
support in this study, which may be attributed to the availability and reach of al-
Shabaab’s Twitter account.   
Aside from the ability to reach a wide audience, al-Shabaab suffered a credibility 
problem with its messaging, further weakening the desired effects of the group. An 
example of the credibility gap during the Westgate attack is with how al-Shabaab is 
                                                 
109 Brittany Card, Justine MacKinnon and Patrick Meier, “#Westgate Tweets: A Detailed Study in 
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referenced. While al-Shabaab consistently referred to the attackers as mujahideen, the 
attackers were most consistently referred to as thugs, gunmen, and terrorists by Twitter 
users during the attack – with thugs being the most common reference.111  The attackers 
were also referred to as “al-Shabaab,” though the use of the group’s name peaked quickly 
before reverting to other monikers denoting terrorist or criminal. The short time frame for 
referring to the attackers as al-Shabaab is most likely due to the group claiming 
responsibility for the attack as illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Terms Used to Reference Westgate Attackers112 
Al-Shabaab’s radio propaganda presents the same problems of accessibility and 
credibility as Twitter. Advances by AMISOM forces and the KDF forced al-Shabaab to 
close Radio Andalus stations in Mogadishu and Kismayo, thus eliminating the two 
largest markets for listenership.113  Al-Shabaab’s declining control of southern and 
central Somali towns resulted in inconsistent broadcasting coverage, hindering the ability 
of the group to disseminate its message to a significant segment of the Somali 
population.114  This effect of AMISOM and Somali government success on Radio 
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112 Ibid. 
113 BBC News, “Somalia Islamist Abandon Kismayo Amid AU Attack.” 
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Andalus propagation is demonstrated with the dramatic drop in output shown in Figure 5 
following the capture of Kismayo by the KDF in September 2012.   
Compounding inconsistent reach and lack of access to significant Somali radio 
markets, Radio Andalus also suffers from a significant credibility problem. Surveys 
conducted under the auspices of the UN indicate that within Somalia, the top three most 
listened to stations are BBC Somali Service, Voice of America (VOA), and Radio 
Mogadishu – with Radio Andalus being the eleventh most listened to.115  When asked 
about how often a particular station is listened to, 70 percent of respondents listened to 
BBC Somali Service several times a week, compared to 42 percent for Radio Andalus.116  
The most damming survey responses listed Radio Andalus as the least trustworthy radio 
station, falling below the BBC Somali Service, VOA, and Radio Mogadishu by a margin 
of 49 percent.117   
The low trustworthiness of Radio Andalus results from the gap between al-
Shabaab’s messaging and reality on the ground. Messaging disseminated through Radio 
Andalus is heavily biased towards reporting al-Shabaab battlefield victories and 
government failures, as indicated by the heavy emphasis on the operational capacity and 
narrative themes shown in Figure 7. Al-Shabaab never mentions setbacks or defeats in its 
radio broadcasts, instead choosing to maintain a defiant tone against the Somali 
government and AMISOM.118  This defiant tone may reflect the intent of al-Shabaab, but 
fails to reflect the reality on the ground that populations can observe for themselves – 
particularly when AMISOM and Somali forces continue to oust al-Shabaab from 
strongholds such as Kismayo. With an easily identifiable gap between rhetoric and 
reality, the low trustworthiness rating for Radio Andalus should not be a surprise, 
partially explaining the statistical ineffectiveness of Radio Andalus to influence violence 
and protests. These observations are further demonstrated by the low overall 
effectiveness Radio Andalus had towards both mobilize for jihad and degrade support. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Statistical analysis indicates that al-Shabaab’s propaganda output does not readily 
translate into effects. Despite al-Shabaab’s efforts with Radio Andalus and Twitter during 
the course of this study, the statistical models indicate that al-Shabaab’s overall 
propaganda effort could be considered ineffective or counterproductive depending on the 
desired effect.   Further analysis shows correlation between some themes and behaviors 
that correspond to desired effects; however these results fluctuate depending on format 
and total message volume. While individual behaviors such as critical media or violence 
may increase with certain propaganda themes or methods, behaviors are only components 
of an effect and are not conclusive without also evaluating how the propaganda themes 
behave across aggregated behaviors. Certain themes such as strategic authority and group 
identity and cohesion demonstrated effectiveness from Twitter through individual 
behaviors through the aggregated effect, indicating those themes are particularly 
important for al-Shabaab. These statistics serve as a useful starting point for 
understanding and tackling the persistent problem of al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa. 
Statistics, however, do not determine causality and must be carefully evaluated within the 
context of the larger environment. Further examination is required to determine why al-
Shabaab’s propaganda effectiveness is statistically limited, and what this means for 
counterterrorism policy in the Horn of Africa.  
A. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS 
This study sought to determine the effectiveness of al-Shabaab’s propaganda 
during a dynamic operational period for the group. The timeframe of this study includes 
al-Shabaab’s most significant defeat with the loss of Kismayo, through successes such as 
the merger with al-Qaeda and the spectacular attack in the siege on the Westgate Mall. To 
gain a fuller understanding of al-Shabaab’s propaganda effectiveness would require 
further longitudinal analysis of the group’s efforts from its split with the ICU in 2007 
through its control of Mogadishu to identify any fluctuations in patterns of propaganda 
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and behaviors.119  This would allow a comparison between the rise of al-Shabaab as a 
splinter movement of the ICU, through the height of its power, to where the group is 
today.   
While a statistical analysis of al-Shabaab’s propaganda provides an optic into 
effectiveness, more study needs to be conducted as to reasons why the propaganda is 
generating inconsistent effects. Quantitative and statistical analysis provides a partial 
explanation, however a detailed qualitative analysis is required to examine how the 
content of the propaganda resonates or fails to resonate with the targeted audience. Such 
an analysis requires access to the Somali population both within Somalia and throughout 
the vast diaspora to gauge reactions to al-Shabaab’s messaging. Qualitative analysis 
would also provide feedback into more statistical analysis by identifying additional 
variables to study and refining current assumptions and data. 
Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the interaction between al-Shabaab’s 
propaganda efforts with the information programs of Western and regional governments 
is another topic that deserves attention. The statistical ineffectiveness of al-Shabaab’s 
propaganda identified in this study does not imply that competing information efforts are 
successful. Western and regional efforts to influence behavior could be just as ineffective 
as al-Shabaab’s efforts, with other factors such as famine and poverty having causal 
relationships to population behavior. Effective or not, friendly information programs 
require an honest assessment compared to al-Shabaab efforts to determine how to wisely 
allocate limited resources for regional influence.   
This study focused on analyzing behaviors from a statistical standpoint without 
accounting for risk acceptance from Western and regional societies. A qualitative 
analysis of risk acceptance in regards to terrorist propaganda and population behavior 
would provide another useful optic towards propaganda effectiveness. Governments and 
populations from the Horn of Africa will have a different tolerance of risk for al-Shabaab 
recruitment than Western societies due to proximity to Somalia, current military 
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commitments, and previous experiences with being attacked. Conversely, Western 
countries may be more sensitive to non-ethnic Somalis with passports being recruited 
from within their borders and returning after gaining experience fighting in Somalia. 
While the recruitment of a single Muslim convert from Alabama to fight in Somalia 
might not be statistically significant, it could carry greater weight for policy makers who 
have a lower risk tolerance for foreign fighter recruitment from within the borders of the 
United States.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Statistical results show that al-Shabaab’s overall ability to influence is in decline 
with regard to their Twitter and radio propaganda. From an operations and policy 
perspective, the urge to “counter” al-Shabaab propaganda needs to be carefully 
reconsidered. As the target of al-Shabaab’s virulent rhetoric, regional and Western 
governments must weigh the effectiveness of that rhetoric with the compulsion to directly 
confront al-Shabaab in the information environment. Directly countering ineffective al-
Shabaab messaging runs the danger of lending credibility to a message that was not 
credible to begin with, and such efforts have been argued to be “ineffective at changing 
an attitude or behavior” if not coupled with programs that enable greater social 
cohesion.120  With this in mind, options for gaining an advantage over al-Shabaab in the 
information environment include continuing to degrade al-Shabaab’s ability to propagate 
its message, highlighting alternatives to al-Shabaab, and highlighting discrepancies in al-
Shabaab messaging. 
As noted with Radio Andalus, decreasing al-Shabaab’s ability to disseminate its 
message decreases effectiveness through minimizing reach. Messaging requires extensive 
reach, repetition, and credibility to be effective.121  Disruption of propaganda platforms 
affects two of the three variables through reach and frequency. Multiple suspensions of 
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al-Shabaab’s Twitter account resulted in the group having a small fraction of its peak 
followership throughout its most high profile attack at the Westgate Mall. During month 
of September 2013, al-Shabaab was never able to directly reach more than 1,400 people, 
with a number of those being journalist and media outlets.122  Relying on journalists and 
media outlets to disseminate its message effectively placed control of the message outside 
of al-Shabaab’s control and diluted the message. Media organizations and journalists had 
the option to distribute, or not distribute al-Shabaab messages, and to provide editorial 
commentary on the message in the process.   
Disrupting al-Shabaab’s Twitter presence has a secondary benefit besides limiting 
the group’s reach. Every time al-Shabaab came back online a new account name had to 
be disseminated to al-Shabaab’s followers. While suspended, opportunists had the ability 
to create fake accounts to propagate misinformation using account names similar to those 
previously used by al-Shabaab. Sometimes these accounts even get suspended, thus 
lending further credibility to the fake account. This is a drawback for jihadist 
organizations using a free, readily available microblogging service like Twitter to shape a 
narrative. While Twitter allows al-Shabaab to instantly interact with supporters and the 
media, duplicate accounts create confusion, draw potential followers away from the real 
account, and corrupt the reliability of messages.123  This scenario played out with fake 
accounts disseminating false information about the Westgate attackers that was widely 
distributed by the media. One such account released the supposed names and nationalities 
of the attackers and claimed that the attackers were predominately from the United States, 
Canada, and Europe – forcing al-Shabaab to spend valuable time to correct the hijacked 
narrative.124   
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Counterterrorism agencies could use Twitter’s openness against al-Shabaab to 
limit its reach. Account closures generated by Twitter were a result of al-Shabaab 
violating Twitter terms and conditions, which agencies could use to follow accounts and 
report violations to Twitter. Agencies could also create dummy accounts using 
derivatives of al-Shabaab’s account name to limit the group’s options for quickly 
regenerating its Twitter presence. Not only would this limit al-Shabaab’s reach, but also 
provide the opportunity to quickly capitalize on opportunities to surreptitiously spread 
rumors and false information to corrupt al-Shabaab’s messaging strategy during a high 
profile event or period of vulnerability.   
The best way to limit the reach of al-Shabaab radio stations would be to continue 
applying military pressure on al-Shabaab strongholds. When faced with losing a town 
where a Radio Andalus station is located, al-Shabaab historically relocates radio station 
equipment to avoid having it captured.125  Some of this equipment formerly belonged to 
other radio stations taken over by al-Shabaab, such as Radio Qoran in southern Somalia, 
which should be replaced through aid and exchange programs for prompt reestablishment 
once al-Shabaab is ousted.126  As AMISOM or Somali forces prepare to liberate a 
population center where Radio Andalus operates, mobile radio stations could get former 
programs broadcasting again to provide a credible and alternative voice to al-Shabaab’s 
content. Providing a messaging platform that is not only an alternate to Radio Andalus, 
but is also credible and recognizable from pre-al-Shabaab control would accomplish 
more to counter Radio Andalus than would directly confrontation with al-Shabaab’s 
messaging. 
Countering Radio Andalus broadcasts with government or commercial stations is 
an initial step towards offering a credible alternative to al-Shabaab’s rhetoric, though the 
messaging must be backed up with action to be credible. Al-Shabaab messaging is 
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predominately focused on defeating Somali and AMISOM forces while countering 
Western influence and establishing an Islamic state based on sharia law.127  Like other 
jihadi movements that attempt to govern and control populations, the message and 
execution of al-Shabaab programs are long in bluster and rhetoric but fall short on 
meeting societal needs.128  This leaves a void that government and independent radio can 
fill with content focused on increasing social capital and highlighting local through 
national governments as alternatives to al-Shabaab rule. 
While violent extremist organizations may “enjoy a degree of perceived 
legitimacy due to the presence of an unpopular domestic or local regional government,” 
this perception can be flipped on al-Shabaab’s unpopular rule in Somalia to increase 
government legitimacy as an alternative to al-Shabaab.129  Radio programming by itself 
will not provide legitimacy for the Somali government, but will instead act as an 
important catalyst towards increasing local credibility. Care must be taken to avoid 
falling to the same trap as al-Shabaab by focusing messaging on one-sided coverage of 
the conflict and denigrating the adversary through consistently pointing out perceived 
failures. This study has shown these information tactics by al-Shabaab to be statistically 
ineffective with the negative effectiveness of the relevance, operational capacity, and 
group identity and cohesion themes. Unlike Radio Andalus, messaging should reinforce 
what the audience can see for themselves, and not attempt to cover up setbacks through 
verbal posturing. More effective messaging would instead acknowledge setbacks, 
identify remedies, and welcome commentary. Doing this would undercut al-Shabaab’s 
narrative without directly addressing its propaganda, particularly if the Somali 
government and AMISOM focused their messaging efforts on transition of security tasks 
from AMISOM to Somali forces to undercut perceptions of foreign occupation. 
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As a supplement to providing alternatives to al-Shabaab, efforts could be made to 
highlight discrepancies in al-Shabaab’s narrative. An easy target would be to focus on al-
Shabaab as a fractured movement through publicizing defections of fighters from al-
Shabaab and airing interviews indicating their reasons for leaving the group. 
Opportunities already exist in this regard with a former leader of al-Shabaab, Shaykh 
Hasan Dahir Aweys, surrendering to Somali authorities following a dispute with al-
Shabaab’s late emir Ahmed Abdi Godane.130  Awyes has already been an outspoken 
critic of al-Shabaab policy and strategy, giving radio interviews prior to his surrender that 
criticized al-Shabaab’s relationship with al-Qaeda and the indiscriminate killing of 
Muslims.131  With Aweys’ nationalist aims being at odds with al-Shabaab’s transnational 
jihad ambitions, combined with his former leadership roles in the Somali Army and ICU, 
he could prove to be valuable as a credible voice of dissent from al-Shabaab—which 
would resonate with Somali audiences. 
To counter foreign fighter recruitment, highlighting the plight of Omar Hammami 
would be useful. Hammami’s fall from his position as the Western spokesman of the 
group to being hunted and assassinated by the intelligence unit of al-Shabaab, the 
Amniyat, is a cautionary tale for potential recruits.132  Through Hammami’s prolific 
online output chronicling his troubles with al-Shabaab, Hammami provided plenty of 
seed material for government messaging to show the true plight of foreigners who answer 
the call to hijrah in Somalia. By making use of Hammami’s posthumous testimony with 
statements from Aweys, the appeal of al-Shabaab could be undercut when also combined 
with presenting a viable alternative to the group’s violence.  
When highlighting the discrepancies in al-Shabaab messaging, care must be taken 
to avoid directly responding to specific messages from the group, instead focusing on 
friendly themes that undercut al-Shabaab legitimacy. This study has provided evidence 
that al-Shabaab’s influence is in decline with its aggregated propaganda having no 
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significance toward the group’s ability to degrade support to its adversaries, and being 
statistically counterproductive towards mobilization for jihad. The negative effects of al-
Shabaab’s operational capacity theme provide opportunities for regional governments to 
highlight discrepancies between propaganda and reality. Coupled with providing credible 
alternatives to al-Shabaab and disrupting propaganda sources, al-Shabaab’s influence can 
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